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This article is about the potentially losing battle to save the Eurozone in the long term. The 
Eurozone, the greatest achievement of the European Union, is losing its glamor and is in danger 
of losing its appeal as the promise of perpetual prosperity for every participant faded away. 
The Eurozone architecture was created on the grounds that is almost designed to fail. Various 
policies such as quantitative easing did not help boost economic growth as the best remedy for 
economic troubles. Profound federalist-type reforms are necessary if the Eurozone is to have 
a longer-term future. Policymakers have at least two urgent tasks to save the Eurozone. The 
first is to relax budgetary rules and to change the mandate of the European Central Bank to 
add growth and employment to the low inflation policy objective. The second is to introduce 
belatedly federal instruments such as a common budget, automatic stabilizers (transfers), 
fiscal and banking unions, a system for orderly default, common bonds, and a dispute-
settlement mechanism. This is a tall order that faces strong political barriers. The dissolution 
of the Eurozone would not be the end of the world, and the European Union would return to 
where it was in 1992. Preparations for the post-Eurozone Europe are necessary. 
Keywords: eurozone, monetary integration, optimum currency area, quantitative easing, 
Cantillon effect, Troika, gold, breakup.
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They are blind leaders of the blind. 
And if the blind leads the blind, both will fall into a ditch.
(Matthew 15:14)
1. Introduction
Monetary unions were often, but not always, created as a part of the process of political 
unification among countries1. Economic reasons for monetary unions include enhanced 
monetary stability, improved spatial and industrial allocation of resources, boosted com-
petition because of transparent prices, deepened integration, reduced transaction costs, 
access to wider markets, gains from economies of scale and from trade, as well as gains 
that come from harmonisation of policies. Non-economic reasons such as geographi-
cal proximity, common language, culture, history and religion sometimes contributed to 
monetary unification. The break-ups of monetary unions are often found in political fac-
tors. Once the political unity among the participating countries dissolves, it is most likely 
that the monetary union will vanish [Bordo, Jonung, 1999, pp. 24–25]. Hence, the political 
will and the firm promise and determination to respect fully a common currency system 
explains the rise and fall of monetary unions. Interestingly enough, the Irish 1979 break 
with sterling had no noted effect on trade between Britain and Ireland.
Monetary integration in the European Union (EU), the eurozone, has been expand-
ing its membership which shows its attractiveness, even success. However, the credibility 
of the eurozone is based on a promise — a credible fiat money promise for the time be-
ing — to pay. But it is still an international promise which needs to be tested over time 
and, especially, during lean times and crises2. History is full of such promises that were 
not honoured. There were 69  currency break ups during the 20th century3. In Europe, 
for example, the Latin Monetary Union (1865–1927) included Belgium, France, Italy and 
Switzerland (Greece joined in 1868), while Denmark, Sweden and later Norway belonged 
to the Scandinavian Monetary Union (1873–1914). Apart from insufficient economic 
convergence among the economies of the involved countries, high and diverging rates of 
inflation, the domino effect in banking crises and a lack of political union that could en-
force policies were always among the principal causes for their demise. The same holds for 
the Austro-Hungarian, Czechoslovakian4, Soviet and Yugoslav economic unions towards 
the end of their existence [Jovanović, 2015]. 
The real problem for governments is related to the issue of how to honour interna-
tional promises and, at the same time, please domestic voters, if they matter. As long as 
governments are sovereign (no political union), the eurozone will have the potential to 
break up (the risk of a break-up is not zero). Monetary unions in Europe have a limited 
1 Exceptions included small states such as Andorra (with Spain), Monaco (with France), Liechtenstein 
(with Switzerland), Luxembourg (with Belgium), San Marino and Vatican (both with Italy). In addition, 
Ireland shared currency with Britain for quite some time.
2 The Byzantine gold solidus maintained its purchasing power essentially unchanged for over five 
centuries (498–1030 AD) [Rickards, 2012, p. 171].
Napoleon introduced the gold franc in 1802. That currency was in use till 1914. It survived tumultuous 
times in the French history such as revolutions in 1830 and 1848, Napoleonic wars (1803–15) and the war 
with Germany (1870–71).
3 Currency disunion. The Economist. 7 April 2012.
4 The breakup of the Czechoslovak monetary union is a rare case that took place under stable 
circumstances. 
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shelf life; break ups have always been a risky idea5. In any case departure, from monetary 
unions has been common and a familiar eventuality in Europe over the past two centu-
ries. There was always an initial “shock” for a country after departure, but ultimately the 
initially negative effects were usually rather temporary. 
Various economic models (and tainted results), may provide politicians with various 
grounds for all kinds of manipulations. The British departure from the EU, the Brexit, 
is an obvious example6. One needs to recall that “essentially, all models are wrong, but 
some are useful” [Box, Draper, 1987, p. 424]. In addition, empirical credibility of econom-
ics ‘is likely to be modest or even low’ [Ioannidis, Doucouliagos, 2013, p. 997]. However, 
even though predictions are notoriously difficult in economics and linked with many un-
knowns and uncertainties, there are matters that the economists know, but to a more lim-
ited way than the textbooks might make one think. We know that the droughts (if there 
is no reliable and efficient irrigation) often lead to crop failures. This increases prices of 
crops and often to increases in the incomes of those who are lucky enough to have a crop 
to harvest (because the market demand is inelastic). We also know that major monetary 
expansions to cover government budget deficits lead to inflations and, if persisted in, to 
hyperinflations7. We know that if an economy is depressed that austerity measures lead 
to more unemployment, even slower growth and more pain and suffering to the people. 
This article is about the potentially losing battle to save the eurozone in the long term. 
Following this introduction, section 2 briefly reviews theory of monetary integration. Sec-
tion 3 presents promises and deliveries regarding the eurozone. Section 4 explains how 
the eurozone troubles happened. Quantitative easing and the Cantillon effect are subjects 
of sections 5 and 6, respectively. The impact of the banking industry on the policymaking 
and the unelected institution such as the Troika are considered in sections 7 and 8, re-
spectively. The Greek problem is found in section 9. Responsibilities for the situation and 
reforms including the eurozone breakup are elaborated in sections 10 and 11, respectively. 
A search for alternatives such as cryptocurrencies and gold are subject matters of sections 
12 and 13, respectively. The article gloomy conclusion about the long-term future of the 
eurozone is in section 14. 
2. Theory
The modern theory of monetary integration started with considerations of optimum 
currency areas [Jovanović, 2015]. The first principal contributors were Mundell, McKin-
non and Kenenen. They dealt with the one-criterion monetary integration models. [Mun-
dell, 1961] proposed factor mobility as a criterion for monetary integration. For him, a 
region is the optimum currency area, as people and factors move easily within it. Factor 
mobility is the criterion that determines a region. Within the currency areas factors are 
mobile, while between them factors are immobile. Fluctuating rates of exchange are, ac-
cording to Mundell, the adjustment mechanism between various currency areas, while 
factor mobility and flexible labour markets (i.e. quicker firing) are the equilibrating mech-
anism within them. 
5 Many countries that emerged from the former Soviet Union found it hard to go it alone and were 
looking for a certain re-linking with Russia. 
6 A. Mikhailova. Project Fear's Brexit predictions were wrong by £100 billion, new report says. The 
Telegraph. 22 April 2018.
7 I am grateful to Richard G. Lipsey for these comments. 
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McKinnon focused attention on the degree of openness of a country [Mckinnon, 
1963]. Goods in a country may be distributed between tradables and non-tradables. The 
ratio between those goods determines the degree of its openness to trade. Normally, the 
smaller the country, the greater its trade with other countries. A high degree of openness 
reflects this country’s relative (high) specialisation and it may be taken as the criterion for 
the optimum currency area.
Kenen’s contribution stated that countries whose production is diversified (criterion 
for an optimum currency area) do not have to change their terms of trade with foreign 
countries as often as the less-diversified countries [Kenen, 1969]. A reduction in foreign 
demand (an external shock) for a country’s major export item may have a relatively small-
er impact on the diversified country’s employment than on a specialised country’s econo-
my and employment. Finally, links between home and foreign demand, as well as export 
and investment, are weaker in a diversified country than in a specialised one. Large and 
frequent exchange rate changes are not necessary for a diversified country because of the 
overlap in the reduction and increase in demand for various export goods. This overlap 
may keep the proceeds from exports at a relatively stable average level. Kenen suggested 
that fixed rates of exchange are suitable for diversified countries. 
An extension of the three initial contributions to the theory of monetary integration 
came in the 1970s and beyond. Deepening of integration in the EU stimulated thinking 
about possible monetary integration. [Werner, 1970], for instance, argued in favour of the 
coordination of economic policies as a criterion for an economic and monetary union. 
Uncoordinated economic policies among countries may be a principal reason for the dis-
turbance in the balance of payments. Coordination of economic, in particular monetary, 
policies from a supranational centre requires political will on the part of the participating 
countries because it goes to the heart of national sovereignty. A system of safeguards that 
includes assistance in the form of transfer of funds to countries that are in trouble is an 
essential feature for the survival of an efficient monetary union.
Another criterion for monetary integration deals with the rate of inflation. [Flem-
ing, 1971] argued that a similar rate of inflation among the potential member countries 
provides grounds for monetary integration. Diverging ratios of employment to inflation 
among these countries will cause hardship and lead to disagreements about the necessary 
policy actions. Countries with a balance-of-payments surplus would be requested to ac-
cept a higher rate of inflation compared to the situation when they are free to choose this 
ratio. Conversely, countries with deficits may be asked to tolerate a higher rate of unem-
ployment than they would be willing to accept if they were free to choose it on their own. 
Alternatively, the well-off countries would be asked to transfer funds to the ones that are 
in economic trouble. 
Other definitions of an optimum currency area include the following. Machlup said 
that an optimum currency area was a region in which no part insists on creating money 
and having a monetary policy of its own [Machlup, 1979, p. 71]. A monetary union that 
imposes minimum costs on the participating countries may be called an optimum cur-
rency area [Robson, 1983, p. 143]. An optimum currency area may be alternatively defined 
as an area in which the net benefits of integration (e.g. increase in welfare in the form of 
greater stability in prices and smaller disturbances coming from abroad) outweigh the 
costs (restraint to individual uses of monetary and fiscal policies) [Grubel, 1984, p. 39]. 
That is, “the last recruit conferred more benefits than costs on existing members, but the 
next one will do the reverse” [Maloney, Macmillen, 1999, p. 572].
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Monetary integration continued to be considered from the vantage points of costs 
and benefits [Jovanović, 2015]. Costs of monetary integration for the participating coun-
tries include:
 • loss of national sovereignty in the conduct of monetary policy: money supply, rate 
of interest and rate of exchange;
 • loss in the choice between unemployment and inflation;
 • capital would flow to the already prosperous countries or regions.
 • loss of seigniorage; 
 • costs from switching to a new currency. 
Potential benefits of monetary integration are numerous, but generally intuitive in 
their nature. They are barely quantifiable and non-economists have difficulty in compre-
hending their character and significance. The principal gains from monetary integration 
are the following:
 • improvement in integration of markets for goods, services and factors; 
 • prices are transparent and directly comparable. This boosts competition and 
specialisation in tradable goods and services. Spatial and industrial location of 
resources is improved;
 • with stable prices, interest and exchange rates, internal trade and investment flows 
are not volatile, as there is no exchange rate risk and uncertainty;
 • hedging and transaction costs are significantly reduced;
 • by unifying monetary and coordinating fiscal policies, the participating countries 
are led to fewer distortions while combating macroeconomic disequilibria. This 
introduces both a greater internal monetary stability and an increase in influence in 
international monetary affairs. This contributes to economic growth and dynamic 
gains;
 • the pooling of national reserves of foreign currencies is also advantageous for 
the members of a monetary union. By internalising their “foreign” trade, these 
countries reduce their demand for foreign currency reserves. Such reserves may 
not be necessary for trade within the group, but they may still be needed for trade 
with third countries. Savings in funds can be invested in alternative and more 
productive uses.
The net effect of monetary integration may not be easily and directly quantified. The 
‘new theory’ of monetary integration suggests that there are somewhat fewer costs (loss 
of autonomy to handle domestic macroeconomic policies) and somewhat more benefits 
(gains in credibility in the fight against inflation) associated with monetary integration 
[Tavlas, 1993, p. 682]. Dissimilarities in economic structure increase the cost of participa-
tion in a monetary union for countries. Hence countries such as Britain (with a rather 
flexible labour market and domestic production of crude oil) may be advised to stay out of 
such an arrangement, while countries such as France and Germany may fare much better 
in it [Dellas, Tavlas, 2005]. 
To sum up, a monetary union introduces significant losses into the constitutional 
autonomy of participating states, but real autonomy to conduct independent monetary 
policy for a small open country in the situation of convertibility, synchronised economic 
cycles and openness for trade and capital flows will remain almost intact.
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3. Eurozone: Promises and Deliveries
Monetary integration is the area where real and deep integration is tested. The euro-
zone, with the euro as the common currency, is the crown jewel in the European integra-
tion project. Even though the euro is the greatest of the EU’s successes (together with EU 
enlargements), it also represents its weakest link which is instead of integrating eurozone 
countries creating not only economic divisions, but also political rifts. 
Following the reunification of Germany in 1990, France wanted to lock the “robust” 
Germany into the European project for a long time to come. This was done through mon-
etary integration. Starting in 1999, the process was technically based on a political com-
promise (Maastricht Treaty), rather than on initially sound economic basis8. In essence, 
the arbitrarily set Maastricht criteria for the eurozone participation were for each country: 
annual deficit 3 % of the GDP and 60 % debt-to-GDP ratio. 
The eurozone started out among 11 EU member states9 in 1999. The euro as the eu-
rozone über-currency10 started circulation in 2002. It was the most ambitious project in 
Europe since the Bolshevik Revolution (1917). No currency has circulated in Europe so 
widely since the Roman Empire. The introduction of the euro in January 1999 was the big-
gest currency innovation since the introduction of the United States (US) dollar in 1792. 
In general, the conditions set for the eurozone in Maastricht were a political decision/
compromise with little regard for the suggestions/conditions that came from economic 
theory11. Not only economic theory, but also rich experience suggests that for a success-
ful and long-lasting monetary integration the group needs to have from the start at least:
 • automatic stabilisers (including fiscal transfers);
 • common federal-type budget;
 • fiscal and banking unions (including deposit insurance);
 • system for orderly default on public debt;
 • dispute resolution mechanism, especially to manage insolvent countries, and
 • a political union.
Unfortunately, politicians that created the eurozone defied those principles. 
There were advance warnings being voiced about a possible train crash in the mak-
ing well before the eurozone came into effect in 1999. As early as 1997 [Jovanović, 1997, 
p. 67–68] argued in favour of the postponement of the implementation of the eurozone as 
the conditions were not yet becoming for such a crucial integration step. At that time, the 
fiscal and banking union requisitioned for a single currency area were not in place. They 
still aren’t. The same holds for automatic stabilisers. Harbouring doubts about the prema-
ture adoption of the euro, 155 university professors of economics from Germany signed 
a declaration in 1998  for an orderly postponement of the implementation of the euro- 
zone12. The reasons pertained to the unsuitable economic conditions in Europe. It is hard 
8 A survey of theory of monetary integration may be found in [Jovanović, 2015]. 
9 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal 
and Spain. Greece was allowed to join the eurozone in 2001. 
10 Über (German) — above, superior, upward of, beyond. 
11 The interested reader is invited to consult [Praussello, 2011] on this point. 
12 Kosters W., Neumann M., Ohr R., Vaubel R. German economics professors convinced “orderly 
postponement” of euro essential. Financial Times. 9 February 1998.
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for two economists to agree on anything; having a choir of 155 of them chanting with one 
voice is an extraordinary occurrence.
When the eurozone was created and the cherished German mark abandoned, the 
explicit and implicit promise made by the EU elite to the Germans and others in the euro-
zone was that the euro, a new über-currency, would: 
 • be a “glorified version” of the German mark;
 • bring perpetual growth and prosperity to everyone, hence solidarity among the 
participating countries would be enhanced;
 • be stable;
 • that financially thrifty countries would not have to bail out prodigal ones; and 
 • that German taxpayers would not foot the bill for all of the above. 
Were those promises honoured and delivered? Apart from stability of the euro on the 
international money market, there was nothing else that all users of the euro in the euro-
zone enjoyed. Many would trade that stability for economic growth. What the people have 
seen and experienced in the eurozone are as follows:
 • the banking fiasco (2008); 
 • the eurozone mess (2011); 
 • zero or anaemic real growth; 
 • austerity13 (as devaluation is not possible);
 • debt; 
 • tensions within the EU;
 • uncertainty; 
 • high unemployment (especially among the young);
 • rising poverty; 
 • gap between rich and poor EU countries that remains large;
 • disenfranchised citizens (democracy suffered); 
 • public protests;
 • decline in public investments; 
 • weak banks (especially in the south);
 • deterioration in public services;
 • economic pain. 
After the 20-years long operation of the euro, the eurozone achievements are more 
controversial than ever. This asks for serious analysis and investigations as a controversial 
study by [Gasparotti, Kullas, 2019, pp. 4–5] found out that:
“In 2017, out of the examined eurozone countries, only Germany and the Netherlands gained 
from the euro. In Germany, GDP went up by €280 billion and per-capita GDP by €3,390. Italy 
lost out most. Without the euro, Italian GDP would have been higher by €530 billion, which 
corresponds to €8,756  per capita. In France, too, the euro has led to significant losses of 
prosperity of €374 billion overall, which corresponds to €5,570 per capita. In Italy, therefore, the 
introduction of the euro led to a drop in prosperity of around €74,000 per capita or €4.3 trillion 
for the economy as a whole, over the period 1999 to 2017. For France, the loss amounts to almost 
€56,000 per capita or €3.6 trillion respectively. Germany achieved an increase in prosperity of 
€23,000 per capita and €1.9 trillion respectively”. 
13 Austerity means cuts in public expenditure, increases in taxes or both. 
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This is not the development that was promised by the EU elite to the population be-
fore the introduction of the euro. Therefore, the resentment by the population against the 
EU elite should not come as a surprise. 
4. How did it Happen?
The great initial success of the eurozone during the years 2000–2007. Eurozone mem-
bership reduced risk related to government bonds between different countries, so there 
was almost no difference between the strong EU core and the comparatively weak EU 
periphery. They all converged to the low-risk German level. The peripheral countries had 
unprecedented access to cheap loans. They (and others) were exposed to the “perpetual 
cheap money illusion”. Debt-financed consumption had little in common with nation-
al economic fundamentals and growth. The assumption made by investors was that the 
Greek, Italian or other government bonds were almost perfect substitutes for the low-risk 
German ones. The crises revealed that this was not the case. 
During the “happy hours” (2000–2007) the EU countries which had a history of mon-
etary indiscipline (high inflation and high rates of interest) borrowed a lot at a (low) rate 
that was not warranted by their respective national economic fundamentals. Those gov-
ernments, their private sectors and households borrowed cheaply and excessively. The 
inevitable happened: over-borrowing and excessive optimism about the eurozone (super 
optimistic promises about the eurozone were oversold) were not matched with the eco-
nomic realities of repaying loans. Collected taxes and earned wages were insufficient to 
repay loans. Rates of interest accelerated to almost 30 % in Greece. That is the rate at which 
a country that does not control own low-inflation money cannot operate. Countries en-
tered into deep recession without the possibility to exit for a decade, two or three or more. 
Commenting on the eurozone troubles, [Mody, 2018, p. 459] stated:
“The inevitable adversity that would test the eurozone came as the global financial crisis in 
2007 and then continued as multiple rolling eurozone banking and sovereign debt crises through 
to 2013. During these years, the euro caused the most damage in the weakest eurozone countries, 
widening existing income disparities between member nations. Without their own currencies 
to devalue, the southern countries struggled to recover from the repeated economic shocks. The 
crises left even France hobbled with high debt and youth unemployment problems familiar to the 
southern group of countries. In contrast, the strongest survived the best. The German economy 
came out virtually unscathed”.
This created sharp tensions between the southern eurozone countries and Germany. 
Is debt good or bad? The reply to the question on whether it is smart to buy some-
thing now for which one does not have cash, depends on circumstances, i.e. for what pur-
pose one uses debt. If one wants to get a better job, then debt for training or education may 
be smart. However, if in a similar situation one prefers to take a loan to pay for a travel to 
Monaco to see the Formula 1 race or to go on a cruise in the Caribbean, well such a choice 
may not probably be the best pick. The same logic applies to the governments, especially 
for the countries in a precarious situation. Debt for infrastructure development or educa-
tion of the population that may contribute to economic growth in the future might be su-
perior to the same investments in an amusement or a gambling facility or bailout of failed 
banks that have no recovery chances. Government debt to fight the existential threats such 
as the Nazis or similar menace may be justified. Still, to go into public debt to bribe the 
population or to buy social peace (increase private consumption) is rather problematic. 
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The economies of countries in the eurozone periphery were poorly prepared to cope 
with such a flood of cheap loans in the “foreign” currency that they do not control14. 
Irresponsible borrowing had a full counterpart in reckless lending across Europe. After 
2007 the financial market reacted to the alteration in the perception of the national risk 
(the origin of the crises was not a speculative attack on the euro). National bond yields 
were returning towards their historical averages. The Roman god Bacchus may as well join 
the Greek god Dionysus and close shop and turn out the lights for a while. The party’s over. 
Big players such as Germany and France have also often broken and ignored eurozone 
rules. France, for instance, has been breaking the eurozone deficit rules (maximum 3 % of 
the GDP) on yearly basis since 2008 without sanctions. The pressure for an increased pub-
lic expenditure from to the gilets jaunes (yellow vests)15 protesters will have the same effect 
on the budgetary situation in the near future. This is how the eurozone rules are “applied” 
on big players. Another set of application of eurozone rules applies to other countries. For 
instance, in October 2018
“Italy’s coalition government, comprising the far-right Lega and the populist Five Star 
Movement (MS5), presented a draft budget that included many of the parties’ electoral 
pledges, such as a basic income for the unemployed and the shelving of a previous pro-
posal to raise the retirement age. The budget would have increased Italy’s deficit to 2.4 % 
of GDP, higher than that planned by the previous administration, but lower than the EU 
limit of 3 %. Nevertheless, in an unprecedented move, the European commission rejected 
the budget for breaking its fiscal rules. Rome’s growth forecast, it insisted, is overoptimistic 
and the real deficit-to-GDP ratio would exceed 3 %. Italy was threatened with sanctions. 
Last week, the government in Rome caved in, drafting a new, more austere budget”16.
The French President, Emmanuel Macron, an exponent of the financial industry, 
tried reforms and cut taxes that benefited corporations and the rich. To make up for the 
fall in public revenue, he increased taxes on fuel and tobacco. That was the last straw that 
initiated the yellow vest protest in France, first in the rural areas, then throughout the 
country in 2018 and beyond. The budget deficit would rise to over 3.2 % in 2019. This does 
not worry France as this country never paid real attention to this rule enshrined in the 
Stability and Growth Pact. This rule is for others in the eurozone, not for France. 
The differential treatment of EU countries is evident. Hence, one should not be sur-
prised that general public support for the EU is vividly abating. This is a fertile soil for 
extremists and anti-EU forces. For example, 
“the EU is an irreformable instrument for impoverishing the continental periphery and the 
working people of each country to the benefit of a predatory class whose wealth increases with 
every one of capitalism’s succeeding crises”17.
14 Japan, Britain or the US can borrow a lot in their home fiat currencies. If huge deficits emerge and 
create troubles, those countries may use inflation (print own money) and find the way out of difficulties. 
That is not possible in the eurozone as the euro is not controlled (not fully) by the domestic authorities in 
each participating country. 
15 Gilets jaunes are the contemporary reincarnation of the sans-culottes (without breeches) the late 18th 
century movement by the common and disenfranchised people in France. They protested against poverty 
and many turned into militant proponents of the French Revolution.
16 Malik K. Europe’s merciless treatment of Italy only hardens popular resentment. The Observer. 
16 October 2018.
17 Wright N. Why communists back Brexit. The Guardian. 3 January 2019. 
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Free markets in the EU exist only for the poor and weak. Big corporations (banks 
included) often privatised governments and socialised their own business failures. The big 
and rich are protected (socialism) and subsidised with enormous amounts of taxpayers’ 
money. The Royal Bank of Scotland, for instance, got an injection of up to €111 bln of 
public money in 200918. These are pure Marxist principles, but in reverse. 
The banks and banks-prone government “elite” share an array of goals, ideas and 
dreams. This is a politically toxic mixture found within the same group of people that fa-
vours big business to the detriment of democracy, taxpayers and consumers. Democracy 
means the rule of the people and their elected representatives, not rule by the bankers 
and other special interests. If something goes wrong in the economy, as happened during 
2008 (and beyond), the elite does not pay the price, but rather the taxed general public, 
which loses jobs, salaries, careers, savings, pensions, student grants, health care benefits, 
homes and hope. The deep crisis was “engineered” by the bankers’ financial alchemy19. 
Still, the bankrupt bankers were able to extract subsidies (hundreds of billions of dollars 
and euros) and continued to distribute bonuses!20 The general interest of the society was 
overridden by specific and concentrated interests by the bankers. If one wants to have 
and keep a market economy (and capitalism), one must accept bankruptcies. Otherwise it 
would be like promoting Christianity without heaven and hell. If there are no bankrupt-
cies, and if private risk and failures are socialised, you have state socialism — socialism for 
the already rich while “free markets” are for the others (usually weak and poor). 
The eurozone was the French idea. It was “imposed” on Germany after the German 
reunification. France also wanted to reduce the economic gap between the two countries. 
However, one of the most worrying matters for France (and the eurozone) is the ever wid-
ening gap in industrial production with Germany. This may be the background for other 
economic cracks between these two countries. Instead of narrowing as intended, the gap 
is accentuated. Even though Britain has been outside the eurozone, when compared its 
index of industrial production with Germany, it performed much better than was the case 
with France and Italy in the post-2008 crisis period. Staying outside the eurozone may as-
sist better the industrial production than being a part of it.
So far the eurozone works well only for Germany and, perhaps for the Netherlands, 
hence it would be a difficult job to convince Germany to change something of crucial im-
portance in the euro system. Therefore, Germany would fight tooth and nail to preserve it. 
To be tough on France as the German chancellor Angela Merkel was on Greece is a non-
starter. In the EU all countries are equal, but some are more equal than others. France can-
not be treated as small countries such as Greece, Ireland, Austria21 or Hungary are. France 
18 Willis A. EU approves largest state aid plan in union’s history. EUobserver. 14 December 2009. 
19 The Glass-Steagall Act (1933)  that strictly divided commercial from investment banking had 
37 pages. The Dodd-Frank Act (2010) that tried to resolve the American financial alchemy had 848 pages (it 
was more than 20 times longer than the Glass-Steagall Act). 
20 “Royal Bank of Scotland chief executive Ross McEvan received a total pay packet worth nearly 
£3.8m for 2015, the lender revealed, as it posted its eight straight year of losses. His total pay last year, 
including bonuses and other benefits such as pension payments, was more than double his remuneration 
package in 2014 of £1.8m” (Thomas N. RBS chief ’s pay packet more than doubled in 2015. Financial Times. 
26 February 2016). In spite of miserable profits, Deutsche Bank paid 1,098 staff more than €1 mln a year in 
2017 (A French habit is spreading. The Economist.7 March 2019). 
21 The EU introduced diplomatic sanctions against Austria in February 2000  as the coalition 
government of Wolfgang Schüssel (People’s Party) included Jörg Heider’s right-wing Freedom Party because 
of its anti-immigration, pro-Nazi and anti-EU platform during the October 1999 elections. This was the 
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needs Germany in the eurozone to keep it enshrined in the EU (not to do something on 
its own). However, Germany is changing. Economic might, problems with immigration of 
Muslims and the appearance of the Alternative for Germany on the political scene from 
thin air would modify the German perception of the EU, alliances and the euro. 
5. Quantitative Easing or “Money for Nothing”
One response to the eurozone crises, introduced by the influential banking cast22, was 
the application of ‘quantitative easing’ (QE), i. e. purchase of predominantly government 
bonds by the European Central Bank (ECB). The intention was to flood the financial in-
stitutions with cheap capital in order to stimulate lending, increase liquidity and promote 
economic activity. The idea behind QE and extremely low interest rates was to “force” 
investors to invest in other more profitable ventures. It is suggested that the pumping of 
“free” money (“cash for trash”) into the economy would increase real estate prices and 
create the “wealth effect”23. Those that had real estate, i.e. baby boomers (born between 
1945 and 1965) experienced an enormous increase in the value of their property. There 
was also a cost, especially political. The millennials (born between 1981 and 1996) were 
priced out from property. The old (insiders) became subsidised and comfortable, while 
the young (outsiders) were “punished”. When real estate and other asset prices increase 
faster than wages, wage earners fall behind in wealth and social influence. The standard 
social contract that economic prosperity benefits everyone falls apart. Division in the so-
ciety became stark both in Europe and in the US24. This damaging QE side-effect con-
tributed to popular protests and the rise of large-scale populism which was not countered 
effectively by the elite:
“Telling the people that they shall not be populist confirms the populist charge of arrogant elites 
disconnected from the anxieties and aspirations of Main Street” [Schmidt, 2019, p. 55].
Cantillon described the wealth effect as early as in 1755 (p. 39). Investors would feel 
richer because of the increased value of their real estate and invest more in the economy 
and, therefore, boost it. Experience has proven that this idea is nonsense. When safe in-
vestment assets have very low rates of interest, this gives a signal that there is no recovery 
on the horizon. Why, then, invest? The eurozone countries need to cure their chronic 
disease: weak spending and low consumption. The deflationary bias needs to be cured by 
flexible public spending rules (over an economic cycle). Private and public expenditure is 
necessary, but the eurozone rules prevent that (a cap on budget deficits). QE created price 
first time that the EU as a whole criticised domestic policies or attempted to influence the composition of a 
member country’s government — even before the new government had put a foot wrong.
22 QE, an unconventional expansionary monetary policy, was introduced in the US by Ben Bernanke 
in 2008 in order to avoid mass default. 
23 If rate of return on capital (r) is greater than the rate of economic growth (g) inequality increases. The 
winners in this game are persons that own real estate in popular and rich cities. For instance, in Vancouver, 
real estate owners “were rewarded so handsomely last year that they made their owners about C$25 billion, 
or about 30 % more than the C$19 billion the entire city population made in employment earnings the entire 
year” (Durden T. Vancouver Homeowners Made More From Sitting On Their Assets Than The Entire City 
Did By Working. Zero Hedge. 4 June 2016). 
24 Student loans, especially in the US, are a huge problem as many students are trapped in debt which 
they would never be able to pay back. They will never buy a house. 
Вестник СПбГУ. Экономика. 2019. Т. 35. Вып. 3 371
distortions. Fine art and real estate prices especially in top locations (London or Monaco) 
went through the roof. 
Mario Draghi, the ECB President, said in 2012  that “policy makers will do what-
ever is needed to preserve the euro”25. Translated into plain language, this means that this 
bank will, among other things, buy bonds of troubled (bankrupt) eurozone countries in 
unlimited quantities. Hence, this is equal to an endless printing of banknotes to finance 
governments. 
The QE strategy (“money for nothing”) of the ECB was active in the period March 
2015—December 2018 according to the following monthly schedule:
 • €60 bln from March 2015 until March 2016;
 • €80 bln from April 2016 until March 2017;
 • €60 bln from April 2017 to December 2017;
 • €30 bln from January 2018 to September 2018;
 • €15 bln from October 2018 to December 2018.
During the 1371 days of the QE the ECB pumped in the eurozone economy €2.600 bln 
(€7,614 per eurozone person). This is on average €1.896.425.966 per day. The hope was 
to create extra demand, to accelerate inflation, reduce the value of the euro (to increase 
exports) and to boost business confidence and economic growth. What was the result of 
this policy?
The ECB, headed by Draghi (a former Goldman Sachs fellow), pumped in the euro-
zone’s financial system up to €80 bln a month (the EU’s annual budget is about €130 bln). 
When QE was introduced, the expectation was that it would last only two years. The in-
tention was to give a boost to consumption which would revive anaemic economic ac-
tivity. That revival did not happen. Why? The bankers and the wealthy used that money 
to buy US government bonds (higher rate of interest) and invested in real estate in tax 
havens such as Monaco where they do not pay taxes. Money did not go to debtors, but 
to creditors; money did not go to workers through wages or welfare, to the people that 
would spend that money, that would buy goods, services and pay bills which would revive 
the economy. Instead of creating inflation, QE created deflation. Money stayed with the 
wealthy, i.e. banks which mostly kept it within its circle. 
There will be no improvement in the eurozone as long as QE or other forms of money 
creation are directed towards speculative activity. Money needs to be directed towards 
production. The post-Global Financial Crisis economy has temporarily been fixed, but the 
trust in the system has not been restored. Nonetheless, if the real growth does not return 
to the eurozone or if the situation in the economy worsens, there are hints from Draghi 
that QE would be restated26. What does this mean? It means that the banks would be able 
to continue to get money for “free” and then “lend” it to the population via credit cards at 
predatory rates of interest. The QE Ponzi scheme will burst like all of them do. 
The QE money remained in the banking industry which benefited most from the 
QE “honey spoon”. Rather than giving away trillions of euros to the banks (through QE) 
which do not invest further, a “helicopter drop” of money from the ECB to each citizen in 
the eurozone — say €1000 or even five or ten times as much, in a few instalments — may 
25 Black J., Randow J. Draghi says ECB will do what’s needed to preserve euro. Bloomberg, 26 July 2012.
26 Jones C. China stimulus measures would boost eurozone, says Draghi. Financial Times. 28 January 
2019. 
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be a superior economic policy choice. Citizens would spend those funds and this would 
contribute to inflation, production, employment and growth. Alternatively, governments 
may take that “helicopter money” and increase public expenditure that would stimulate 
the expenditure in the private sector. QE was from bankers for the bankers (bailout), not 
for the people. 
Greece was excluded from the ECB’s QE because “Greek government bonds did not 
meet the quality criteria required by the ECB in the framework of its QE programme”27. 
Greece ‘misbehaved’ in the past, but the country was implementing draconian measures, 
hence this ‘punishment’ by the ECB should have ceased, but it did not. 
6. The Cantillon Effect and the “Honey Spoon”
Richard Cantillon (1680–1734)  an Irish-French-Dutch-English economist and a 
banker was one of the early writers about economics and banking. In his 1755 Essai sur 
la Nature du Commerce en Général (Essay on the Nature of Trade in General) (written in 
about 1730) he left a powerful and lasting message:
“It is a common idea, received of all those who have written on trade, that the increased quantity 
of currency in a state brings down the price of interest there, because when money is plentiful 
it is more easy to find some to borrow. This idea is not always true or accurate (p. 50). Then the 
King augments anew the coinage, settles the new ecu or ounce of silver of the new issue at 5 livres, 
begins with this new coinage to pay the troops and the pensions. The old coinage is demonetised 
and received at the Mint at a lower nominal value. The King profits by the difference (p. 67). But 
all the sums of new coinage which come from the Mint do not restore the abundance of money 
in circulation. The amounts kept hoarded by individuals and those sent abroad greatly exceed the 
nominal increase on the coinage which comes from the Mint (p. 68)”.
This is to say that the first receiver of the new money profits most, i. e. more than 
the following ones. In the eurozone case, this is the banking industry which invests to an 
extent outside the eurozone and which often buys the US and other government bonds 
because of yields. 
The Cantillon effect explains the uneven spread of the newly printed amount of 
money. The monetary expansion by a central bank does not spread evenly throughout an 
economy. The Austrian economist Friedrich August von Hayek compared this monetary 
expansion with a spoon of honey in a cup of tea. Honey sticks to the spoon well before 
it melts in hot water. The closer one is to the new money pumped into an economy, the 
higher the benefit. 
One of the first lessons that students of economics learn during their 101 course is 
that artificially low prices of money stimulate bad investments, there is no interest-rate 
market filter that permits only potentially profitable investments. To addict the economy, 
especially banks, to a strong economic drug such as QE (financial crack cocaine) and then 
withdrawing it may create a serious problem. 
The problem was not that there was a flow of capital towards the eurozone periphery. 
The problem was that it ended up in the property bubble (real-estate gamble) first, and 
then in the commodity price gamble. Who is to blame? The culprits are obvious: defective 
banks, the snowballing herd-like behaviour of investors, as well as imprudent govern-
27 Grauwe P. de. The ECB grants debt relief to all nations except Greece. VOX. 13 May 2016. 
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ments. Not the euro. Countries such as the US, Britain, Iceland and other non-eurozone 
countries (Hungary) had property bubbles too. Being in the low-interest-rate eurozone 
only provided the possibility for the Irish and Spanish to get cheap loans to invigorate 
the property boom. Low-cost financing gave imprudent entrepreneurs the opportunity 
to undertake too many projects at the same time. Capital was misallocated and wasted in 
certain projects (too many houses and apartments remain empty and cheap). In the case 
of Spain, the migration of (affluent) foreigners such as retired into those cheap properties 
may be better than the emigration of Spaniards elsewhere. 
The choice for the public authorities is the following. What is worse for the country: 
a failure of a big bank or a company or an economy with a burden of debt to help failed 
banks and companies (which prevents or slows down new and promising businesses)?
Regarding public assistance to bad and failed banks, Sir Walter Bagehot (1873, IV. 4)28 
left economists and policy makers with an instructive advice. Its value is strong and last-
ing, but the contemporary policy makers ignored this important lesson, just as they did 
with Cantillon’s, to the detriment of taxpayers, gifted entrepreneurs and the promising 
future of the economy: 
“If the banks are bad, they will certainly continue bad and will probably become worse if the 
Government sustains and encourages them. The cardinal maxim is, that any aid to a present bad 
Bank is the surest mode of preventing the establishment of a future good Bank”. 
This means that evolutionary business selection (bankruptcies included) should 
take place in a market economy. During the Global Financial Crisis (2008) governments 
turned back at the market forces and the capitalist organisation of the society. They bailed 
out banks instead letting them go bust as free markets would demand. Capitalism is for 
private gains, but loses are socialised. This gave some support to Schumpeter’s prediction 
that capitalism would be replaced by some sort of socialism. 
How mighty big banks are and how they appropriate the legal and democratic process 
can be seen in the case of Eric Holder, the US Attorney General:
“When the Attorney General of the United States admits some banks are simply too big to 
prosecute, it might be time to admit we have a problem  — and that goes for both financial 
and justice systems…Some observers have defended the Justice Department, suggesting that 
prosecuting law-breaking banks would amount to a death penalty that upset the financial system 
and trigger recession — although nobody really knows if it would do any such thing. But not 
prosecuting law-breaking banks, and confessing to its terror of prosecuting those banks, the 
Justice Department has waved a big checkered flag to the biggest banks to go ahead and break all 
of the laws they want”29. 
The social contract in a market economy is that if you take certain risk and invest, you 
harvest rewards, but you also have to accept failure if things go wrong. What happened to 
big banks was that they took risk, excessive risk, sometimes failed in their business and 
instead of throwing bad apples from the basket, such banks were bailed out by the gov-
ernment, i.e. taxpayers that were not asked anything about such important and expensive 
28 Walter Bagehot (1873). Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market. London: Henry 
S. King and Co. URL: https://www.econlib.org/library/Bagehot/bagLom.html?chapter_num=7 book-reader 
(accessed: 19.01.2019).
29 Gongloff M. Eric Holder admits some banks are just too big to prosecute. Huffington Post Business. 
6 March 2013. 
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actions. Are we living in a post democratic or a post law society? Are the banks holy cows 
of the modern economy and politics? When faced with the Global Financial Crises (2008), 
unlike the US which bailed out banks and letting the offenders scot free, Iceland paid 
off consumers’ loans, forgave homeowners’ debt and put the offenders in prison. Iceland 
started from a clean sheet of paper and bounced back30. 
Continued and growing distrust by the population of the patrician elite that is indif-
ferent to the troubles of the compatriots has mobilised the underclass and an ocean of los-
ers. This is taking place not only within nations, but also between them. The elite sticks to 
its vanity project (the eurozone), now it becomes obvious, at all costs. The elite continues 
to live in a capsule and is incapable of understanding what the popular fuss is all about. 
This obstructs the positive reaction to the popular revolt and might lead to discords and 
conflicts. The social contract is on the verge of falling apart. Common vision of the future 
and an enemy (presumably foreign) was the tissue that connected various actors. Now, 
these have gone. Is the nemesis now the framework in which the EU is bound to live? Brit-
ain is leaving the EU, while Switzerland was under EU pressure and had own Brexit-style 
EU pressure for 30 years and survived outside the EU rather well. 
Economic recovery rests on new investments in low-carbon energy, infrastructure, 
sensors, new and better skills of labour, not on continued austerity and propping up banks 
that make preposterous loans. As long as politicians go cap in hand to powerful vested 
interests that finance their election campaigns, a new and sound growth-friendly push in 
the economy will not be forthcoming. Backlash from the voters is unavoidable. 
How to avoid the repeat of such a financial disaster (Global Financial Crisis)? Well, 
make the system smaller. However, 
“in global finance today, the opposite is happening. The financial ski patrol of central bankers 
is shovelling more snow onto the mountain. The financial system is now larger and more 
concentrated than immediately prior to the beginning of the market collapse in 2007. … the next 
collapse will not be stopped by governments, because it will be larger than governments. The five-
meter seawall will face the ten-meter tsunami and the wall will fall” [Rickards, 2012, pp. 211–212].
In addition, public finances are and will remain fragile because of debt and feeble 
growth of the economy. 
“Stuff happens”, but does not happen rarely. Hence, the bell curve distribution of 
events needs to be flattened in reality. “Black swans” may not be all that rare, for instance, 
in capital market and elsewhere. What matters is not necessarily the “black swan”, but 
rather the response to it. Rickards suggested:
“Societies that are not overtaxed or overburdened can respond vigorously to a crisis and rebuild 
after disaster, while those that are overtaxed and overburdened may simply give up. When 
the barbarians finally overran the Roman Empire, they did not encounter resistance from the 
farmers; instead they were met with open arms. The farmers had suffered for centuries from 
Roman policies of debased currency and heavy taxation with little in return, so to their minds the 
barbarians could not possibly be worse than Rome. In fact, because the barbarians were operating 
at a considerably less complex level than the Roman Empire, they were able to offer farmers basic 
protections at a very low cost” [Rickards, 2012, p. 222].
Current and future policymakers need to keep this experience in mind.
30 Greenstein T. Iceland’s stabilized economy is a surprising success story. Forbes. 20 February 2013. 
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7. Revolving Door and Goldman Sachs
Mega investment banks such as Goldman Sachs have strong and spread global polit-
ical power. Goldman Sachs dispatches its people to the top level of governments world-
wide and offers them lucrative jobs once they leave their public posts (revolving-door 
turnover of politicians):
“This is The Goldman Sachs Project. Put simply, it is to hug governments close. Every business 
wants to advance its interests with the regulators that can stymie them and the politicians who 
can give them a tax break, but this is no mere lobbying effort. Goldman is there to provide advice 
for governments and to provide financing, to send its people into public service and to dangle 
lucrative jobs in front of people coming out of government. The Project is to create such a deep 
exchange of people and ideas and money that it is impossible to tell the difference between the 
public interest and the Goldman Sachs interest”31. 
Former Goldman Sachs bankers such as Mario Monti and Lucas Papademos were 
appointed (not elected) as prime ministers of Italy and Greece, respectively. Another for-
mer Goldman Sachs banker, Mario Draghi, was appointed chairman of the ECB. Inter-
estingly, these appointments of Gloldman Sachs bankers (old boys’ club) all took place 
in November 2011. Hence, instead of elected politicians, Goldman Sachs bankers were 
taking charge32. Taxpayers and 99 % of the population should not expect good news for 
quite some time to come.
Article 245 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states that the 
members of the European Commission ‘shall give a solemn undertaking that, both dur-
ing and after their term in office, they will respect the obligations arising therefrom and 
in particular their duty to behave with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance, 
after they ceased to hold office, of certain appointments and benefits.’ Senior public of-
ficials have a responsibility not only to be followed by example, but also to set the highest 
standards of ethical behaviour. This is law and theory. Practice is different.
Eighteen months after his term as the President of the European Commission (twice 
five years), Jose Manuel Barroso was recruited by Goldman Sachs as an adviser on Brexit 
in July 2016. This is the investment bank that was deeply involved in the eurozone-related 
Greek financial alchemy and disaster. Even though Barroso did not break any law, Francois 
Hollande, the French President, said that Barroso’s choice was “morally unacceptable”33. 
Barroso could have chosen any bank, but not Goldman Sachs. 
Former European Commissioners also found commercial home in big private busi-
nesses. Neelie Croes (Competition Commissioner) joined boards of Uber and Salesforce; 
Karel de Gucht (Development aid Commissioner) joined Arcelor Mittal; Connie Hede-
gaard (Climate Commissioner) joined VW; Martin Bangemann (Commissioner for in-
ternal market and industrial affairs) joined Telephonica; Jonathan Hill (Commissioner 
for financial stability, financial services and capital markets) joined the Union Bank of 
31 Foley S. What price the new democracy? Goldman Sachs conquers Europe. The Independent. 
18 November 2011. 
32 Hillary Clinton received generous a check ($200,000) for a single speech to Goldman Sachs 
(Cillizza C. Why Bernie Sanders should talk A LOT more about Hillary Clinton and Goldman Sachs. The 
Washington Post. 25 January 2016). Tony Blair, the former British Prime Minister, was no different (Bower T. 
A man without morals. The Daily Mail. 1 March 2016). 
33 Chassany A. Hollande blasts Barroso for Goldman move. Financial Times. 15 July 2016.
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Switzerland;… A profound problem and serious concerns with such revolving door affairs 
is that the frormer highest officials and lawmakers join the industry he/she formerly regu-
lated. Suspicions remain. No wonder why there is a wide popular discontent regarding the 
running of the EU institutions. 
The alumni network of excessively powerful Goldman Sachs is impressive. It is the 
greatest one in the global private business. This investment bank is using all available 
“guns” to win business. One day they hire prostitutes to win business in Libya34, the next 
day they hire the former President of the European Commission35. And their business 
goes on. 
The elected politicians are supposed to provide a popular counterweight against the 
demands by powerful businesses. This irresponsible revolving door practice and recycling 
of lawmakers in big private businesses escalates public distrust in government institutions. 
Do elected politicians serve the people or big business, especially big banks? Does the 
political elite know greed or decency? Is this beyond repair? Does this open gates to the 
extremists and the popular backlash against the EU? 
8. The Troika
Many important actions that relate the eurozone take place outside the cover of the 
EU treaties. From 1998 the Eurogroup refers to informal and unofficial monthly closed-
door meetings of the finance ministers of countries that officially take part in the euro-
zone. Hence, it escapes the legal and transparency coverage of the EU laws. Even though 
the Eurogroup’s political decisions on austerity are important and harsh, they are legally 
illegal as this group does not exist in the EU law! 
Created from “thin air” and outside the EU legal structure in 2010, the “Troika” is 
composed of the top officials from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the ECB and 
the European Commission. It is a new institution that is not based on any international 
treaty or national constitution. It is unaccountable to any elected body, but it is the master 
of the economic survival of countries such as Greece. The presidents of the IMF and the 
ECB have no democratic mandate (people did not vote for them), while the democratic 
mandate of the President of the European Commission is rather meagre. The Troika is 
principally in solidarity with bankers, hence the democratically elected national repre-
sentatives are subject to this unelected institution that was created from thin air. The Troi-
ka reviewed the Greek problem as an issue related to liquidity, while in fact, it was an issue 
of insolvency. 
In spring 2010, as Greece wrangled with the IMF and the rest of Europe for what 
would turn out to be a €110 bln emergency loan, a revealing, chilling phrase slipped out. 
When Greece's then Prime Minister, George Papandreou, begged for easier borrowing 
terms, he was told by Angela Merkel that the deal had to hurt. According to a well-sourced 
report in The Wall Street Journal, the German Chancellor said: “We want to make sure 
nobody else will want this”36. In September 2012, Merkel pleaded in favour of “une Europe 
34 Treanor J. Goldman Sachs hired prostitutes to win Libyan business, court told. The Guardian. 
13 June 2016.
35 Spence P. Goldman Sachs hires former EU President Barroso after Brexit vote. The Telegraph. 8 July 
2016. 
36 Editorial. Greece's austerity: democracy tested to destruction. The Guardian. 8 November 2012.
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forte et solidaire [strong and united Europe]”37. This is EU solidarity in the Teutonic man-
ner. For the French, enthusiasm for ‘solidarity’ means something else: redistribution and 
protectionism. 
Who was rescued with emergency loans? “Of the total lent to Greece, less than 
10 percent ever got to the Greek people. The rest went to pay back creditors, including 
German and French Banks” [Stiglitz, 2016, p. 144]. So, the generosity by the Germans and 
the French and others was primarily to save own domestic banks that gave reckless loans 
to Greece even though the story presented to the public was that the assistance goes to 
Greece. How can a debtor that has no economic growth repay loans? The London Debt 
Agreement (1953)  assisted Germany to make a fresh start. This was not the case with 
Greece. 
9. The Greek Problem
Greece is a country with enormous debt and needs solidarity in the form of (gen-
erous) debt forgiveness as its foreign debt is so huge that it can never be repaid in full 
[Jovanović, 2015a]. In addition to the Marshall Plan, it should be recalled, Germany ben-
efited in 1953 from foreign solidarity and debt relief in which Greece participated. The 
London Debt Agreement wrote off roughly a half of Germany’s external debt, which was 
“more than 280 per cent of the country’s 1950 gross domestic product”38. Repayments of 
the rest were linked to revenues from exports39. This debt forgiveness (the German debt/
GDP share was significantly higher than is the current Greek debt/GDP share) was, at the 
time, as controversial as is the current discussion about the possible writing off of Greek 
debt. However, if there is a Greek debt forgiveness precedent, would others in this so 
poorly designed and operated eurozone request the same (moral hazard)? Would market 
confidence flop? Greece and the whole of the eurozone need growth, not never-ending 
austerity. 
The eurozone as it is constructed does not have a problem: it is the problem itself. The 
eurozone architecture morphed into an economic torture chamber. It is like the Procru-
stean bed which forces conformity standards. Procrustes, a bully from ancient Attica, was 
either stretching people or hacking at their legs to make them fit onto an iron bed. The 
modern version of the Procrustean bed is represented in the eurozone’s one-size-fits-all 
austerity policies, which have significantly slowed growth and made unemployment, espe-
cially among the young, a hideous long-term problem (compounded by an endless flow of 
economic migrants and refugees from the Middle East and Africa). Poverty and inequality 
have also risen sharply which creates serious social problems. A real rise in investment 
is rather anaemic. This does not provide grounds for vigorous growth and employment. 
Table presents the evolution of the Greek GDP, deficit and public debt from 2001 to 
2020. The Greek economy shrank sharply in the period 2008–2013. The evolution of the 
deficit during the same period was even sharper. The EU, i. e. the German, remedy was 
to cut spending. However, debt as a share of the GDP almost doubled during the same 
period, not because expenditure increased, but because the Greek economy shrank. The 
37 Saint-Paul P. Merkel plaide pour une Europe solidaire. Le Figaro. 3 September 2012. 
38 Sfakianakis J. History shows why Germany should help Greece. Bloomberg View. 3 December 2012. 
39 Guinnane T. A pragmatic approach to external debt: The write-down of Germany’s debts in 1953. 
VOX. 13 August 2015. 
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medicine may have been worse than the disease. The Greek economy needs growth and 
the externally imposed economic instruments were wrong. Paul Krugman noted that 
“Austerity probably shrinks the economy faster than it reduces debt, so that all the suffer-
ing serves no purpose. The landslide victory of the ‘no’ side offers at least a chance for an 
escape from this trap”40. 
What are the theoretical choices for Greece? Is it simply between the Grexit (Greek 
exit from the eurozone) or destructive austerity with no end in sight? The effect of the im-
posed austerity was that “wages have fallen by nearly 20 % since 2010 with pensions and 
other welfare payments cut by 70 % in the same period. The size of the public sector has 
been cut back by 26 %”41. A toxic mix of policies imposed by the Troika reduced public 
services and led to the collapse of the middle class. Unemployment reached 28 % and the 
young were disillusioned about their future in Greece42. So, 
40 Krugman P. Ending Greece’s bleeding. The New York Times. 6 July 2015. 
41 Boffey D. Eurozone agrees deal to bring Greece out of financial crisis. The Guardian. 22 June 2018. 
42 “While the lack of funds was a significant barrier for investment in the lagging EU regions in the 
past, a new important obstacle appeared in the EU peripheral countries: the lack of people. Emigration of 
the young, educated and the brightest is particularly strong from the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, as well 
as from Poland and the Czech Republic from the time they joined the EU. For instance, Lithuania, a country 
Table. Greece: GDP growth, deficit and debt, 2001–2020
Year
Real GDP,
% change from 
previous year
General government financial 
balances,
Surplus (+) or deficit (–) 
as % of nominal GDP
General government gross 
financial liabilities,
% of nominal GDP
2001 3.6 –5.5 114.1
2002 4.0 –6.0 113.1
2003 5.8 –7.8 108.8
2004 4.7 –8.8 110.1
2005 0.8 –6.2 111.9
2006 5.6 –5.9 116.9
2007 3.2 –6.7 114.8
2008 –0.2 –10.2 119.0
2009 –4.3 –15.1 135.2
2010 –5.5 –11.2 129.1
2011 –9.2 –10.2 109.8
2012 –7.3 –8.8 165.9
2013 –3.1 –13.1 182.6
2014 0.7 –3.7 182.9
2015 –0.3 –7.3 182.7
2016 –0.2 0.5 188.2
2017 0.6 0.8 190.9
2018 0.5 0.3 187.6
2019 0.8 0.1 183.7
2020 0.9 0.3 179.2
S o u r c e :  [OECD Economic Outlook, no. 99 (June 2016); no. 104 (November 2018)].
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“up to 400,000, mostly aged between 20  and 30, have left in the past eight years… So many 
doctors have left since 2010, the cash-strapped health service faces a shortfall of 8,000 doctors, 
said George Patoulis, president of the Athens medical association. ‘The country has lost more 
than 18,000 doctors, not only new graduates but established specialists’ ”43. 
If the euros from the ECB are not available, the Greeks will have to pay wages and 
pensions in certificates. Those IOU (“I owe you”) paper certificates would evolve as a par-
allel currency that would eventually develop into a new drachma. It has become obvious, 
since the most recent debt crisis, that the expected eurozone economic benefits to Greece 
have vanished. A number of observers may agree with Krugman that “The Greek exit from 
the euro is the best of bad options”44. The price to remain in the eurozone is dear. 
The Greek government announced on 2 November 2011 that it would hold a refer-
endum as soon as possible on the bailout programme in order to get a clear mandate by 
the people to stay in the eurozone. That announcement created “shock, panic and an-
ger’ around the world, but especially in France and Germany. The French Prime Minis-
ter François Fillon said that ‘France regretted the unilateral decision by Greece to hold a 
referendum”45. The fear was that a negative reply to the bailout programme would trigger 
sovereign, as well as bank failures that could wreck the eurozone. The Greek government 
withdrew, in a matter of days, the decision under foreign “peer pressure” because of real 
fears that the result by the Greek people would be a no answer. 
Four years later, the Greeks voted on the Troika’s financial-rescue plan and responded 
with a resolute NO (62 %) on 5  July 2015. Does a clear NO vote in a national referen-
dum in an EU country mean NO or does it mean something else? Jean Claude Juncker, 
a member of the Troika and the President of the European Commission, has a rather 
slender democratic mandate. He was appointed by the EU Presidents/Prime ministers 
through the political “black box” and was passed on to the European Parliament for ap-
proval. Juncker “ridiculed the Greek No vote as an unintelligible ‘circus’ ”46. Unelected 
politicians and the EU technocrats hate referendums. Public and democratic voting is not 
the way to do business in the EU. This was confirmed a week after the referendum when 
Greece caved in and accepted the Troika’s draconian deal. Hence, it was all a circus. Do 
the eurozone countries need democratic decisions about crucial national issues or do they 
not? Once again, referendums may not be the ways to do the EU business. Is this a post-
democratic EU? 
The European elite are more and more afraid to verify democracy through referen-
da. Decisions are taken and implemented in the exclusive and closed elite-led political 
process. If things go wrong, the elite which rule over our lives blame Brussels. With this 
in mind, Ken Livingstone’s book has a revealing title: If Voting Changed Anything, They 
of 2.8 million inhabitants in 2019, lost 1 million citizens through emigration since 1990” (Lithuania hopes 
the next century is quieter than the last. The Economist. 15 February 2018). 
43 Hope K. Graduate brain drain hinders Greek recovery. Financial Times. 17 August 2018.
In addition, health-related services suffered (Smith H. Desperate state of Greek medical facilities 
blamed for death of UK tourist. The Guardian. 12 September 2018). 
The problem is not common only in Greece, “around 30 % of Romanian doctors have moved to richer 
European countries where they earn substantially more … doctors in a poor country became taxi-drivers in 
a rich one” [Collier, 2018, p. 970].
44 Krugman P. Ending Greece’s bleeding. The New York Times. 6 July 2015. 
45 News of Greek referendum stuns the world. Bulleten Quotodien Europe. 3 November 2011, p. 4. 
46 Holehouse M. I do not understand Greek referendum circus. The Telegraph. 7 July 2015. 
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Would Abolish It [Livingstone, 1987]. Voting may not be the actual means how the EU 
integration business is done in reality. Whenever the policymakers consult the people on 
EU matters through the voting process and when they do not get the pre-set decision, they 
force the people to vote again and again (Denmark and Ireland) until they approve the 
decision that has already been taken by the ‘dark masters’ of European integration. This 
type of management of EU affairs created a kind of democratic deficit which evolved into 
a democratic crisis. 
A referendum may not always be the most appropriate way to have people speak on 
certain issues. For complicated matters such as treaty texts, voting may be skewed. If the 
voters are not informed properly by the politicians and the media, then sectoral interests 
may prevail. For instance, farmers may be against reductions in subsidies, housewives may 
be in favour of increases in benefits for part-time work, while domestic plumbers may be 
against increases in work permits to foreign plumbers. These sectoral interests may distort 
the general interest that a treaty aims to promote. In certain cases, and if key national 
sovereignty issues are not compromised, national parliaments may be a more appropriate 
places for decision-making. In addition, national referendums in France normally turn 
into voting on the popularity of the current government, no matter if the question asked 
on the voting slip relates only to France or the EU. 
Following the August 2018 deal, Greece exited the bailout programme, but it would 
be under “enhanced surveillance”. Greece would start repaying it huge debt from 2032. 
Nobody knows where will be the country’s economy, the eurozone and the EU at that 
time. This looks like kicking the can down the road. Still, “Germany turns out to be a ma-
jor beneficiary of Greece’s debt crisis as it earned total of 2.9 billion euros since 2010”47. 
The patrician EU elite and “dark masters” of the art of European integration were 
once again indifferent to the plight of their compatriots and did not listen to concerns and 
demands of the people they rule. The elite, for instance, contempt and ignored the popular 
will of the people expressed in a referendum (Greece, 2015). The popular backlash may 
come in 2019 after the elections for the European Parliament. If anti-EU forces gain ma-
jority, the whole EU law-making process may be in jeopardy. 
10. Who is Responsible?
Bankers in Europe were lending to the “prodigal” Greece in the full knowledge that 
the loans would not be repaid. They expected (re)payments from (home) governments. 
Both sides violated basic banking principles:
 • borrowers should be careful about borrowing. Their duty is to pay back loans;
 • creditors must verify the creditworthiness of borrowers, their existing debt, assets 
and future stream of income. Creditors’ moral duty is to lend diligently. If they do 
not do their homework on being careful in giving loans, well, then they deserve 
what transpires. 
Although Greeks themselves have a sizeable share of responsibility for the trouble 
(excessive expenditure), others were also far from innocent. In fact, all types of sales (legal 
and illegal) to Greece were strongly encouraged both officially and covertly. Hence the 
47 Stam C. Germany earned €2.9 billion from Greece’s debt crisis. EurActiv. 21 June 2018.
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blame should be shared. Foolish creditors always find reckless debtors. Here come just a 
few illuminating examples of illicit German sales to Greece. 
The biggest corruption scandals in Greece involved German high-tech and defence 
firms. Ferrostaal, the German arms producer, was fined (€149 mln) in 2011  for giving 
€62 mln in bribes to the Greeks to buy (faulty) submarines at inflated prices48. Further-
more, in March 2012 the Greek government reached an out-of-court settlement with Ger-
man company Siemens related to bribes. Siemens would pay a fine of €170 mln for bribes 
to Greek state employees and ministers for the procurement of equipment49. In addition,
“a Greek court has been provided with conclusive evidence that the largest tax avoider in the 
country is Hochtief, the giant German construction company that runs Athens airport. It has not 
paid VAT for twenty years, and owes 500 million euros in VAT arrears alone. Nor has it paid the 
contributions due to social security. Estimates suggest that Hochtief ’s total debt to the exchequer 
could top one billion euros”50.
The Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF (2016) document revealed unprofes-
sional and dirty work behind the scene by the IMF concerning financial crisis in Greece 
and other counties hit by the Global Financial Crisis. Here come just a few details. “The 
IMF’s policy on exceptional access to Fund resources, which mandates early Board in-
volvement, was followed only in a perfunctory manner” (p. vii); “the troika arrangement 
potentially subjected IMF staff ’s technical judgments to political pressure from an early 
stage” (p. viii); “some documents on sensitive issues were prepared outside the regular, 
established channels” (p. viii); “written documentation on some sensitive matters, even 
with the help of generous staff resources, could not be located” (p. 5); “a number of factors 
undermined the quality and effectiveness of surveillance. First, the analysis often lacked 
sufficient depth, rigor, or specificity” (p. 22); “failure to grasp fully the functioning of the 
single currency” (p. 25); “a major downsizing of the IMF staff that took place during 2008–
09 reflected this culture of complacency among the IMF’s membership” (p. 27); and “there 
was no clear demarcation of responsibilities between the IMF and its European partners, 
and their areas of competence overlapped considerably” (p. 41). Those quotations lead to 
three conclusions:
 • the financial rescue strategy for Greece, Ireland and Portugal was not implemented 
in the coherent way and it was not based on proficient analysis;
 • excessive political pressures overturn economic facts and professional IMF’s work;
 • the IMF failed the standards of responsibility and transparency as are expected 
from public institutions.
48 Ferrostaal shareholders approve EUR149  million fine in bribery case. The Wall Street Journal. 
14 October 2011; [Pitelis, 2012, p. 8]. 
The EU countries sold Greece over €1 billion of arms during the first bailout deal in 2010. France was 
the biggest seller, but the pro-austerity advocates (Germany and the Netherlands) were also active. “An aide 
to the then Greek leader, George Papandreou, who asked to remain anonymous, told the news agency: ‘No 
one is saying ‘Buy our warships or we won't bail you out.' But the clear implication is that they will be more 
supportive if we do’” (Rettman A. EU figures show crisis-busting arms sales to Greece. EUobserver. 7 March 
2012). 
49 Hope K. Siemens to pay €170m to Greece over alleged bribery of officials. Financial Times. 9 March 
2012. 
50 Ali T. Diary. London Review of Books. 30 July 2015. 
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Donald Tusk, the President of the European Council, suggested a “special place in 
hell” for those that backed Brexit without a plan51. What would such a “special place in 
hell” look like? Yanis Varoufakis, the former Greek Minister of Finance, tweeted on 7 Feb-
ruary 2019:
“probably very similar to the place reserved for those who designed a monetary union without a 
proper banking union and, once the banking crisis hit, transferred cynically the bankers’ gigantic 
loses onto the shoulders of the weakest taxpayers”.
To criticise Greece as the only culpable party in the financial catastrophe is unjusti-
fied. Again, responsibility is shared. However, it is easy and arrogant to blame the victim 
for its own trouble. In spite of the shared responsibility for crisis, the adjustment cost 
fell, i.e. was imposed on the Greek side only. The deep post-2010 Greek depression did 
not happen because Greece did not follow Troika’s conditions, but rather because Greece 
followed them. Austerity usually has slim economic effects, while it creates harsh social 
troubles and discontent. 
11. Reforms or Breakup 
The eurozone works well only for Germany and for very few other countries. This is 
because:
 • all eurozone countries must have fully open domestic market for the German (and 
other EU produced goods and services); 
 • no eurozone country may devalue to compete with the German (and other EU 
produced) goods and services.
In the absence of the euro, developments on such a scale would not be possible. For 
other countries, such as Greece, the eurozone was brutal.
As the real economic growth in the EU was feeble, the EU changed in 2014 the sta-
tistical methodology used to calculate the GDP. The new methodology includes in the 
coverage illicit economic activities such as smuggling, drug trafficking and prostitution. 
Such an economic and statistical alchemy slightly increases the GDP, politicians may relax 
a bit and boost their confidence, however, few would feel richer because of such statistical 
makeup52. What else needs to be reformed?
As there are no possibilities for the adjustment in exchange rates among the eurozone 
countries, there is a suggestion to the countries in trouble to apply “internal devaluations” 
(reducing domestic prices and wages). Still, this is hard, costly and highly unpopular. The 
problem is that there is no inverse policy suggestion to the export surplus countries to in-
crease domestic prices and wages. Such “internal revaluation” is also unpopular, but these 
countries feel less pressure than the countries that have deficits in trade. 
The German excessive current account surplus is one of the principal causes of im-
balances in the eurozone. One way to solve the problem was proposed by [Priewe, 2019, 
p. 100]:
51 Boffey D., Rankin J., Stewart H. Tusk warns of “special place in hell” for those who backed Brexit 
without a plan. The Guardian. 6 February 2019. 
52 Fox B. Sex and drugs drive EU growth surge. Euobserver. 17 October 2014.
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“Within the ‘European Semester’ and among the ‘Country-Specific Recommendations’ with 
‘Medium-Term Budgetary Objectives’ of the Commission, current account surpluses play 
hardly any role. Regarding sanctions, excessive surplus countries could be barred from access to 
structural funds — having to replace them with domestic funding — or obliged to pay a tax on 
the surplus that would be channelled into a fund to support industrial policy in countries with 
a weak export base. A key measure would be supporting countries with structural deficits in 
establishing industrial policy to improve non-price competitiveness and lean against the wind of 
further deindustrialisation”.
There is no doubt that Germany has an upper economic hand in the eurozone. How-
ever, this may not last forever in the fiat currency world. The ‘eurozone trilemma’: inde-
pendent ECB, perpetual export surpluses and no fiscal transfers (all at the same time) 
cannot last too long. Something has to give up otherwise the crisis is imminent. 
Reforms of the eurozone are urgently needed as one is witnessing a slow motion 
train crash. Dark clouds, for instance, are looming over Italy. This country did not have 
real growth for 20 years. The population is disillusioned. Italy’s debt is high (130 % of the 
GDP), the balance sheets of Italian banks have €128 bln of non-performing loans (loans 
in arrears of over 90 days)53, and the public infrastructure is in poor shape (the collapse of 
the bridge in Genoa in 2018 with 43 fatalities is just one example of troubles). Eurozone 
deficit rules strictly limit public expenditure which severely restrain the inflow of fresh 
capital (economic oxygen) into the economy. 
Eurozone-instigated cuts in public expenditure bite into Germany too. The defence 
budget is affected. For instance in 2014, “a shocking example is the decrepit state of Ger-
man military hardware. Of the Luftwaffe’s 254 fighter planes, 150 cannot fly”54. The situa-
tion became even more serious in 2018. Eurofighters are state of the art combat aircrafts. 
Out of the 128 Luftwaffe's Eurofighters only four were combat ready55.
A temporary means to bridge the crisis in the form of the European Financial Stabil-
ity Facility was created in 2010 to assist Greece, Ireland and Portugal. This Facility, super-
seded by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) (2012), has the financial “firepower” of 
€ 500 bln. Eurozone ministers agreed in principle, but not in detail, at the end of 2018 to 
create a eurozone budget to fortify the ESM. There are ideas to transform of the ESM into 
a eurozone’s version of the IMF. If the German position remains that it needs to be done 
through the Lisbon Treaty’s change, then the chances that this would happen soon are 
very slim.
The 2018 proposals for a deeper eurozone integration by the French President Macron 
were based on strong federalist grounds (common budget to assist countries in economic 
troubles; European Finance Minister). The eurobonds are also a well-known federal idea, 
but for such bonds there must be a strong vision of a common future. Eurozone success-
fully eliminated exchange risk. However, risk in general remained, but it was transformed 
into a credit risk inside the eurozone. Currency unions do not operate without some kind 
of risk sharing and political union. The Macron’s deep federal vision was strongly criti-
cised by 154 prominent German economists. Macron should perhaps put his own house 
53 Smid B., Soedhuizen B., Teulings T. The transition to a banking union for the EMU. VOX. 
10 September 2018. 
54 Münchau W. Eurozone stagnation is a greater threat than debt. Financial Times. 20 October 2014. 
55 Huggler J., P. Luftwaffe “down to four” combat-ready Eurofighters out of 128, as pressure builds over 
weak defence spending. The Telegraph. 2 May 2018.
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in order and only then preach what to do in the EU. There is a stark division in opinions 
on how to reform the eurozone. The Germans argued in favour of an orderly eurozone 
departure framework for insolvent countries56. Macron’s federalist-type proposals were 
put aside even though
“Germany seems to recognize the importance of a banking union for the functioning of a single 
currency, but, like St. Augustine, its response has been, “O Lord, make me pure, but not yet.” 
Banking union apparently is a reform to be undertaken sometime in the future, never mind how 
much damage is done in the present”57.
The future of the fiscal and banking union is unclear. Germany and the Netherlands 
resist the pan-eurozone deposit insurance scheme, a vital part of the banking union, be-
cause of the fear that other countries failures would be foot by the German and Dutch 
taxpayers’ money. As a temporary measure, Germany and a few other eurozone countries, 
may encourage the ECB to mutualise the Italian (even the French) debt58. This would just 
postpone (not prevent) a possible eurozone breakup. If this mutualisation happens, the 
can will be just kicked down the road. Joseph Stiglitz thought that
“the central problem in a currency area is how to correct exchange-rate misalignments like the 
one now affecting Italy. Germany’s answer is to put the burden on the weak countries already 
suffering from high unemployment and low growth rates. We know where this leads: more 
pain, more suffering, more unemployment, and even slower growth. Even if growth eventually 
recovers, GDP never reaches the level it would have attained had a more sensible strategy been 
pursued. The alternative is to shift more of the burden of adjustment on the strong countries, with 
higher wages and stronger demand supported by government investment programs”59.
France, under President Macron, introduced in 2018 neoliberal reforms which fa-
voured big businesses. Reforms included tax cuts to big corporations; abolished progres-
sive tax on capital gains; ended indexation of pensions; reduced housing benefits; and ter-
minated liberty in the choice of university education by the state distribution of students 
based on their results at the end of secondary education. That was the reason for strong 
and lasting protests by the ‘deplorable’ big part of the French population (gilets jaunes). 
Social discontent has been brewing and the trigger for protests in 2018 and beyond was an 
increased tax on fuel. The working class that has to use cars for transportation was hit as 
there were no increases in wages60.
56 Jones C., Brunsden J. German economists attack Macron vision for eurozone reform. Financial 
Times. 23 May 2018.
57 Stiglitz J. Can the Euro Be Saved? Project Syndicate. 13 June 2018. 
58 “Poland’s foreign minister has labelled France a ‘sick man of Europe’ on national TV this week. He 
may be right, but France is hardly the only one, and there’s no silver bullet for the smorgasbord of ailments 
on show. Can Europe get fighting fit before May’s elections?”(By Morgan S., Brzozowski A. The Brief — Sick 
men of Europe. EurActiv, 18 December 2018).
59 Stiglitz J. Can the Euro Be Saved? Project Syndicate. 13 June 2018. 
60 Earlier, “beyond being an economic crisis, the collapse of 2008 was a social crisis. It was a great 
revealing of the deeply immoral financial arrangement of our societies, the criminal ineptitude of our 
regulators, the disastrous corruption of our democracies by money. What broke in 2008 wasn’t primarily the 
economy: it was the people’s faith in the reigning world order. The economy has been fixed somewhat but this 
faith has not been restored. This social crisis, unlike the economic crisis, never stopped — everything we’re 
experiencing on the global political stage today, from the rise of social movements beginning with Occupy 
Wall Street to the clamorous appearance of ethno-nationalist populism, is a symptom of the unresolved 
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The rebellion against globalisation and in favour of re-gaining national control of af-
fairs may have certain parallels with what took place during the Reformation that started 
in 1517  with the publication of Martin Luther’s Ninety-five Thesis. At that time, there 
was a rebellion against the Catholic Rome that took too much power and money, that 
lived a sumptuous life and that lost touch with the people that paid for all that. The West-
ern Christianity was split (disintegrated) into several denominations. Five centuries later, 
there is now a popular revolt against the EU’s Brussels that does similar errors as the 
Catholic Church did before the Reformation. For instance, the earlier sale of Catholic 
indulgencies looks a bit similar to what does QE. The financial system needs change and 
slimming. For instance,
“during the global financial crises of 2008 subprime mortgage losses were less than $300 billion, 
but when derivatives are included, total loses were over $6 trillion. To reduce the risk of the grand 
collapse ant to increase the robustness, the system needs to be reduced in size so that no component 
may grow too large. ‘Instead U. S. banks are bigger and their derivative books are larger today 
than in 2008. This makes a new collapse, larger than the one in 2008, not just a possibility but a 
certainty. Next time, however, it really will be different. …the next collapse will not be stopped by 
governments, because it will be larger than governments” [Rickards, 2012, p. 211]. 
Is exit or a dissolution of the eurozone a panacea? The consequences of the eurozone 
breakup would be substantial in the short term (Austria-Hungary, the Soviet Union or Yu-
goslavia), but if accompanied with active policy intervention, they would be manageable. 
“The advantages over a five-year horizon would be substantial” [Bagnai, Granville, Mon-
geau Ospina, 2017, p. 533]. Hence, there are significant costs of breaking up the eurozone, 
but there are, possibly, even greater ones related to the keeping it together. Still, there is 
a strong possibility that the bad eurozone marriage continues with a hope by the politi-
cians that are tinkering with some reforms would buy time for a financial fairy to come 
and solve the eurozone’s existential problem with a magic stick. All that they do seems like 
actions by medieval wizards that prescribed leaches as medical therapies (kicking the can 
down the road). 
One has to recall that for the success of a monetary union the participating countries 
need to have not only similar economic structure, but also similar system of beliefs on 
how the economic system works and about social justice [Stiglitz, 2016, p. 45]. This also 
includes similarities in the rates of inflation and unemployment, acceptance of wage cuts, 
exchange rate, taxation, labour standards, social services, environment-related regulation 
and even the energy mix. 
Unemployment in the EU, France, Germany and Britain (2006–2018) is another con-
cerning issue. The gap in unemployment rates between Germany and France is wide and 
worrying, especially since the post 2008 crisis. Just as was the case with industrial produc-
tion, Britain outside the eurozone, performs significantly better than France even in the 
unemployment indicator. Was or is the eurozone a stumbling block for the French eco-
nomic policy and prosperity? 
If a eurozone country is shut out of an open capital market or if the loan terms are 
prohibitive (as was the case with Greece), the country is destined to have a permanent 
slump. It is forced to make painful reforms and it may encounter the temptation to re-
social crisis of 2008” [White M. The collapse was a social crisis — and unlike the economic crisis, it has never 
stopped. The Guardian. 14 September 2018]. 
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introduce its national currency. This currency may be devalued and printed ‘freely’. The 
problem is that while the introduction of the common currency, the euro, was orderly (it 
was introduced on the basis of a detailed plan, timetable and fixed exchange rate), the re-
verse operation would not be orderly. It would be noisy, nasty and involve anger and panic. 
The cost would be enormous and hard to estimate. These costs would include a run on the 
banks to avoid forced conversion into a new and weak currency, as well as the logistical 
nightmare regarding conversion of contracts, bonds, deposits, mortgages and wages. Even 
though the exiting country could have its own (devalued)61 currency, it would still face 
payments of foreign loans in euros. Benefits that may come from the breaking of a mon-
etary union (or leaving it) may be volatile62. A country may devalue and increase exports, 
in particular if it has low import dependence (inputs) of its exports. Nonetheless, even if 
the cost of the eurozone breakup is colossal, this will not in itself prevent it from happen-
ing. The peaceful and orderly Czechoslovak dissolution may provide an inspiration63. If 
there is a social group that may gain something from such chaos, those are mostly lawyers. 
The root cause of weak competitiveness of national goods and services on interna-
tional markets has most often been low productivity, lack of innovation, rigid wages and a 
meagre flow of labour from low to higher productivity industries. Devaluation may help a 
country only temporarily, but it does not eliminate the root causes of low competitiveness. 
Hence, the potential benefit of the breaking up of a currency union (in the EU) or an exit 
from it may be rather slim in the longer term unless the competitiveness and productivity 
issues are addressed sufficiently. 
Generally speaking, austerity policies in certain eurozone countries were not offset by 
expansionary policies in others. Hence, harsh austerity worsened the debt/GDP ratio and 
increased unemployment in the eurozone. Germany and the Netherlands have current 
account surpluses, but many of these may be accumulated unserviceable claims. Would 
these two countries be better off without such export surpluses? Incredibly harsh auster-
ity packages and painful bailouts will be the rule of the game in the eurozone for many 
years to come. Strange and unsavoury politicians and movements are mushrooming in 
countries subjected to the draconian eurozone austerity measures. The reason this is tak-
ing place is that the EU elite and respectable politicians, refuse to admit that the imposed 
austerity measures are a tragic failure. The eurozone has turned out to be a dismal mar-
riage. Would a painful divorce be preferable to agonising eurozone matrimony? A Ger-
man proverb says: “Better a horrible end, than horror without end”64. 
The EU elite is either blind or deaf to sense the trouble in which the eurozone is. Silos 
mentality (one-size-fits-all policy) prevails in Brussels and Frankfurt while the people are 
stripped of money and democracy, hence the backlash in the form of public protests65. The 
61 Devaluation will be inevitable as nobody will want the new currency, especially not at a high rate 
of exchange. 
62 Slovenia is an example of a country that broke up from the dysfunctional Yugoslavia and successfully 
went it alone in 1991. Nonetheless, it joined the EU in 2004 and the eurozone in 2007. A larger group is still 
attractive in certain cases. However, would it be also the case now for Norway and Switzerland?
63 Slovakia is in the eurozone, while the Czech Republic is not. Having in mind the Slovak experience, 
the Czechs are not excessively enthusiastic about joining the eurozone. 
64 „Lieber ein Ende mit Schrecken, als ein Schrecken ohne Ende“. 
65 Real problems are: feeble growth, austerity, increasing poverty, lack of hope for the improvements 
in the situation, immigration, terrorism, to name just a few. Brexit was a handy scapegoat to turn attention 
away from those problems to which the patrician elite has no or no good answers or policies.
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gilets jaunes did not emerge from trade unions or political parties. They emerged from the 
disenfrancised and deplorable part of the population that has no money. What remains to 
the people are yellow wests-type of movements and nationalism which may destroy the 
current euro and even the EU from within. Divided societies have a lot of hardship to op-
erate properly. Errors by the patrician elite are not admitted, while troubled vanity project 
is continued. Germany prospers, while most of the others are impoverished of funds and 
hopes. This is especially obvious at the EU’s southern periphery. 
The eurozone operation and crisis triggered a massive transfer of macroeconomic 
policymaking authority away from national governments. More dangerously, it shifted 
policymaking towards institutions that are not enshrined in and controlled by the Treaty 
of Lisbon. This just contributed to the hostile sentiment in the general public towards 
the running of the EU by a remote elite that does not consider much democracy and the 
opinion and needs of the people. 
The EU elite mind-set is entrenched in post-nationalism and post-Cold War view of 
the world. The central points of this new attitude are globalisation and liberal internation-
alism. National interests do not feature high. With such mentality, the EU is incapable of 
reform just as was the approach by the former Soviet Union. For over a decade the EU 
countries do not seem to agree on much of anything of substance.
Technocrats in the European Commission and their mentors lost both political, 
moral and professional respect regarding the eurozone in general and eurozone countries 
such as Greece or Italy. Whatever they forced as solutions went wrong. Italy did not have 
(almost) any real economic growth for a generation (since the introduction of the euro in 
1999). Something new needs to be done. 
The benefits of the eurozone, at least in the south, are controversial and in doubt. 
However, strong popular resistance to the replacement of the euro by national currencies 
is not obvious in that affected region. Many Greeks, Italians or Spaniards profited from 
low rates of interests during the eurozone “happy hours” (2000–2007). They acquired as-
sets such as real estate and savings. They would not vote to get a new national currency 
which would devalue their assets by a half. The young, especially, unemployed have no 
such qualms. They could benefit from a fall in the prices of houses. If the eurozone con-
tinues unreformed, the EU (bar Germany) would be destined to have low growth, high 
unemployment and division between those that have and those that are different. 
The breakup of the eurozone would normally provoke a huge devaluation (especially 
at the eurozone periphery), prices would drop for say Italian Fiats and Spanish Seats and 
the single EU market would be in jeopardy. Germany (or other country) would introduce 
customs posts to control the imports of cheap Fiats and Seats, so what would remain of the 
EU? Aparently, European disintegration may be more difficult than European integration. 
The new German eurozone template (strict rules and punishments) for the operation 
of the EU may provoke perpetual austerity (devaluation is impossible) and no growth, 
when growth actually may be the best way to remedy the situation. How does this square 
with other countries’ visions of the EU? Spain or Greece or Italy, for instance, not to men-
tion the views of many others? The austerity rules may easily provoke violence and ex-
tremism as one country imposes its rules on others. Suspicions are running high — the 
thrifty northern Protestants vs. the prodigal southern Catholics and the Orthodox; Britain 
vs. the Continent; everyone vs. the Germans. It is amazing how more than half a century 
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of European integration has not managed to dissipate deep-seated mistrust and cultural 
conflicts. [Jovanović, 2012, p. 77] wrote:
“During the Great Depression, Heinrich Brüning, the German Chancellor (1930–32), thought 
that a strong currency and a balanced budget were the ways out of crisis. Cruel austerity measures 
such as cuts in wages, pensions and social benefits followed. Over the years crises deepened. This 
led to what the reader of this article knows. Once the financial and the existential storm is over 
and the new EU architecture is in place based on the tough German template, a number of EU 
countries may not like or enjoy the EU that they live in. Many of them may find themselves in the 
slow-lane of European integration. The EU will not be the same again. It is turning into a multi-
speed and multi-directional EU”. 
12. Cryptocurrencies 
Alternative currencies such as bitcoin appeared as new competitors to the fiat cur-
rencies. Still, there are controversies regarding bitcoins and similar options. A currency 
should be a unit of account, medium of exchange and a store of value. If the price of any 
asset changes about 10 % or more a day, is it a currency? So, 
“anything that is so volatile cannot be a satisfactory unit of account. It is itself stable so you can’t 
measure other values against it. It can be a medium of exchange but you would have to fix the 
transaction price instantly, and in any case the capacity of even an established cryptocurrency to 
handle a mass of transactions is limited. As for store of value, well, it clearly isn’t”66.
Such speculative cryptocurrencies are ideal assets to money launderers, criminals 
and terrorists.
The supply of bitcoins is limited. A growing economy needs more money. As there is 
no central bank to step in during inevitable crisis, bitcoins would create an unattractive 
deflation. In addition,
“although Bitcoin is perceived as the currency of the future, it is in fact, like gold, a currency of 
the past. The contrast with modern money is striking. Modern money is also called ‘fiat money’ 
because it is made from nothing. Of course, the production of paper money costs a lot, but we 
use less and less of it. Instead we use more and more electronic money by making payments with 
debit and credit cards. Electronic money is produced with minimal use of scarce resources. As 
the cost of communication continues to decrease, the use of electronic money will become even 
cheaper in terms of resources needed to produce it. In this sense electronic money, not Bitcoin, 
is the money of the future. There is indeed a potential problem with fiat money. Because its 
production is so cheap, there is the danger that too much of it is produced. That then leads to 
inflation. However, since the 1990s, many central banks have followed a policy of strict inflation 
targeting. And that has proved very successful. It has ensured that annual inflation has remained 
close to 2 percent in the last 30 years in most industrialized countries. In the US, for example, 
average yearly inflation was 2.35 % from 1990 to 2017”67.
As long as the “independent” central banks are under political or industry pressure, 
or even worse, privatised by private banks, the public needs to worry that private business 
interests would take primacy over interest of the general public and taxpayers. 
66 McRae H. Cryptocurrencies are about to become worthless — and this is what will happen when 
they crash. The Independent. 21 November 2018. 
67 Grauwe P. de. Bitcoin is not the currency of the future. Social Europe. 11 January 2018. 
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A banker or a financial consultant may take you for a ride by saying says: “This paper 
or this cryptocurrency is a superb investment for you, but it is too complicated for you to 
understand (and me to explain). Just give me your money and be delighted about splendid 
investment you made”. There is golden advice to the potential investors in various (toxic) 
“financial papers” or electronic transactions: “If you do not understand it, do not buy it”. 
13. Where to Go from Here? To Gold?
Collapses of the international monetary system take place almost every thirty years. 
We are limping towards the end of the useful life of the current one. One is witnessing 
volatility, confusion and suboptimal performance of the economy since 2007. The finan-
cial structure that existed prior to 2007  is over, but the new system is not yet in place. 
The new systemic collapse is approaching. “The United States is not getting the growth 
it needs to pay the debt. Derivatives are piling up, the banks control Washington, and 
the financial system is falling. Gold is the only sensible insurance in this state of affairs” 
[Rickards, 2016, p. 70]. No matter its flaws, money based on gold would restore financial 
and monetary order. This may not happen very fast, as those that have political levers, i.e. 
politicians that have the money printing press and that are controlled by private bankers, 
would not give up. Gold would not let them opportunity to manipulate as they do with 
the fiat-money alchemy68. In any case, the new currency may likely be something tangible, 
exchangeable and permanent, not fiat money that may soon have the value of the confetti. 
Let us refer to the Constitution of the US and its Section 10 — “Powers prohibited of 
States” which reads (emphasis MJ): 
“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and 
Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in 
Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation 
of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility”.
Hence, the recognition of value and importance of precious metals as the only legal 
tenders in the US. The only real money is gold (and sliver), the rest is just credit. If a nation-
al legal tender becomes accepted as an international currency, then it is used in interna-
tional trade and finance in a much wider area than is the reach of its original central bank. 
Bitcoin and gold have, however, a few similarities. Both exist in rather limited quanti-
ties; neither generates any revenue; and both are searched by investors that worry about 
the depreciating value of the dollar, euro or other fiat currencies. 
Some argue against the use of gold as a currency. Their strong arguments include the 
following ones: (a) investment in gold is old fashioned; (b) gold does not bring interest; 
(c) gold has a deflationary bias; (d) there are important storage and transportation costs.
Those advocates are the ones that have faith in the fiat money and related financial 
manipulations69. Counter arguments include that:
68 Fiat money and various financial/banking innovations (toxic documents for massive economic 
destruction) permit Ponzi schemes and various “bubbles”. The bubble burst when there are no new buyers 
of the offered asset, i. e. when the last guest arrives at the birthday party to find out that all the cakes have 
already been eaten. 
69 “Markets are manipulated by special interests. For instance, JPMorgan Chase set aside $1 billion 
on legal reserves in 2014 because of possible hefty penalties over allegations that it manipulated the foreign 
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 • the gold standard system is simple, direct and understandable to all (the eurozone 
rules are not only complicated, but also they are applied in an arbitrary way); 
 • gold protects value in the long term as it is rare, divisible (without any loss in value) 
and durable; 
 • gold does not rust;
 • gold is trusted, especially during crisis and in the long term;
 • gold cannot be stolen by hackers; 
 • once central bankers are deprived from their unlimited fiat money printing 
authority, manipulations with fiat money shall be replaced by the use of intellectual 
and other resources towards innovations in technology70, production and better 
management, towards productivity that creates real, not paper wealth which 
ultimately creates disorder and chaos for the 99 % of the society. 
With hard money (gold) in place, corporations will have to compete and compete 
hard with their products and services, not with their influence on those that have the but-
ton in the money-printing press. With fiat money, governments and lobbies may go into 
war (the US is constantly in wars since 2001) in a much simpler way than would be the 
case with hard money. Easy money permits wars for which future taxpayers would foot 
the bill for generations. With hard money, governments would go to war when it is really 
necessary. 
Men in the street normally have a poor idea about the role and operations of cen-
tral banks. This is compounded by Delphic speeches by central bankers such as Alan 
Greenspan. Few could understand his ambiguous speeches about the fiat-money relat-
ed financial alchemy. Gold is different. It is timeless, tangible and the same everywhere 
(which is not the case with, for instance, iron ore of crude oil). While gold has its eternal 
intrinsic value, i.e. melt value, fiat money is a currency without its intrinsic value. It is cre-
ated from thin air. The value of fiat money is either established by the government regula-
tion or by the agreement of the parties that use it. The gold standard would turn (central) 
banking from monetary manipulations into what it needs to be: boring. 
If gold is a “barbarous relict” and old fashioned, then there is one “killer question” for 
the proponents of such ideas. If gold is of marginal importance or irrelevant, why don’t 
you sell all your gold to the Chinese, Indians, Arabs, Russians, Kazakhs, Turks or Hungar-
ians? Many of them, especially the Chinese and others in Asia, would be delighted to pay 
for it in fiat money (to move away from dollars and euros). In addition, why is almost the 
entire US gold hoard located on military bases (Fort Knox71 in Kentucky and West Point 
exchange market” [Braithwaite T., Hall C. JPMorgan sets aside $1bn to cover cost of penalties for market 
manipulation. Financial Times, 15 October 2014]. 
“Furthermore, the Swiss UBS paid $1.5 billion to the American, British and Swiss regulators as a fine 
for the manipulation of interbank lending rates” [Masters B., Binham C., Burgis T. UBS pays price for epic 
scandal. Financial Times, 20 December 2012]. 
“Or Standard Chartered set aside $900 million in 2019 to cover potential fines in the US and Britain” 
[Weinland  D., White  E. Standard Chartered sets aside $900m for fines in US and UK. Financial Times, 
21 February 2019].
70 Rather than being employed by the banks to create and manipulate models there on how to ‘steal’ 
money from others, the best talents from mathematics, physics or management would be employed in the 
real economy to create there, for instance, new and more efficient energy systems (batteries, solar panels, 
reduction in CO2 emissions…), improved management of transport and the like. 
71 Fort Knox, constructed in 1937, was to hold the gold confiscated from the US citizens from 
1933 [Rickards, 2012, p. 72]. 
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in New York) rather than in civilian bank vaults [Rickards, 2012, p. 34]? China, Russia, 
India72 and others are constantly adding to their gold stocks. These countries in the East 
are preparing not only for the post-euro, but also for the post-dollar financial world. The 
further East one goes from the US, the more there is demand for gold. When there is a 
currency crash, those that have gold have the best life-saving financial boats. 
If the value and/or the future of a fiat money, especially international one, is in ques-
tion, then both borrowers, lenders and savers alike normally chose to avoid such a cur-
rency. If the crisis is looming, then the risk-averse holders of such a currency would prefer 
to get rid of it. 
There is also a fundamental difference in attitude towards gold between investors in 
Asia and the ones in the West. While the western investors use their dollars to buy gold 
in order to resell it when the price of gold increases (they get back more of their dollars), 
Asian investors buy gold in order to save and to store value. They have less confidence in 
fiat monies.
14. Conclusions
The euro is the crown jewel in the EU integration project. No similar currency cir-
culated throughout Europe since the times of the Roman Empire. Measured by adoption, 
expansion and official political support, the eurozone is a great success. However, there 
are other and more important measures of success. Growth (or the lack of it), transfor-
mation of the economy and democracy (Draconian ‘ruling’ of Greece by the Troika) are 
those yardsticks. At the same time, the euro is the EU’s weakest link. It needs a substantial 
federal-type overhaul if it is to survive. Uncertainty about its future and the impact on the 
whole EU and beyond is paramount. There are contingency plans in the preparation for 
the eventual split of the EU73.
The properties of a well-functioning economy are clear and well known. They are a 
rapid economic growth the benefits of which are shared widely in a society (solidarity) 
and there is low unemployment [Stiglitz, 2016, p. 5]. The results of the two decades of the 
operation of the eurozone are just the opposite. There are too many losers and too few 
winners. Is it worth continuing with such an important, but a vanity political elite-spon-
sored project or would it be better to dissolve it, lick wounds and try something superior? 
In spite of great hopes and political support, the eurozone has been a failure74. It failed 
to deliver growth and it contributed to various discords. As for the eurozone architecture,
“the euro was a system almost designed to fail. It took away governments’ main adjustment 
mechanisms (interest and exchange rates); and, rather than creating new institutions to help 
countries cope with the diverse situations in which they find themselves, it imposed new 
72 Women and temples in India are supposed to be the biggest private hoarders of approximately 
22.000 tons of gold. This was collected over centuries. Demand for gold (jewelry) in India is high especially 
during the wedding season. A as matter of comparison, there are about 4.600 tons of gold in Fort Knox. 
73 Khan S. Brexit: Macron warns Europe could split after Britain leaves EU and calls for unity. The 
Independent. 5 January 2018; Rankin J. Jean-Claude Juncker: EU is facing existential crisis. The Guardian. 
13  September 2016; K. von Hammerstein. Militärplaner halten Zerfall der EU für denkbar. Der Spiegel. 
4 November 2017; Mason P. The Germans are making contigency plans for the collapse of Europe. Let’s hope 
we are too. The Guardian. 6 November 2017; The EU existential crisis was analysed by [Sidjanski, 2018]. 
74 “The euro crisis was yet another very bitter chapter in the history of the failures of financial 
capitalism” [Fricke, 2019, p. 51]. 
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strictures — often based on discredited economic and political theories — on deficits, debt, and 
even structural policies”75.
The initial diversity among the eurozone countries, both economic, institutional and 
behavioural were great and unfriendly with monetary integration. One-size-fits-all euro-
zone policies without the supporting institutions (federal budget managed by a minister, 
fiscal transfers to the ones in trouble [automatic stabilisers], banking union with a com-
mon insurance of deposits, fiscal rules, common bonds, dispute resolution mechanism 
and political union) which economic theory and rich experience propose, had no great 
chances for success. Still, the EU patrician elite was apathetic to warnings by economists. 
If the eurozone wants to survive in the longer term those suggestions by economists need 
to be supplemented by the abandoning of the existing fiscal rules that choke growth and 
by changing ECB mandate to include economic growth and fight against unemployment 
(the current mandate is to keep inflation low). 
It is hard to find one positive economic effect which the eurozone can provide now 
or in a decade to come. Some would argue that the gain may be found in the ease with 
which travellers may make payments; of course, only those whom have enough euros to 
travel (many tourists are taking only short holidays). Others would argue that the gain 
may be found in the simplicity in trade, while others would argue that this easing in trade 
is the problem itself as countries traded too much, i.e. southern EU countries imported 
too much because loans were cheap. Germany was the principal exporter of goods and 
capital and the eurozone “worked well” until the importing countries could service their 
debt. This could not last forever. 
In spite of serious troubles the euro survived and it expanded its coverage. Still, the 
greatest eurozone success is that it has survived by now, although at a huge cost in terms of 
growth and employment in most participants. However, there is a big difference between 
surviving and surviving well. Inflation was low and under control, but many would change 
low inflation for real economic growth. There was a cost of eurozone paid by most par-
ticipants (bar Germany): austerity, low or no real growth, divergence in living standards, 
crisis, unemployment and contempt of principles of representative democracy. 
At the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the eurozone, Jean-Claude Junker, the 
President of the European Commission, said:
“For 20 years, the euro has delivered prosperity and protection to our citizens. It has become a 
symbol of unity, sovereignty and stability, and we must ensure it continues. ’Thus spoke Jean-
Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, in ‘celebration’ this week of the 20th 
anniversary of the adoption in synthetic form of Europe's single currency”76.
One may really admire his sense of humour. There were no celebrations by the gen-
eral public. Anywhere, a currency needs to be organised around the economy in order to 
serve it, not the other way around as is currently the case with the euro. Automatic inter-
country fiscal transfers are essential for the currency union to work. This federal instru-
ment is absent in the eurozone. The eurozone as we know it is almost finished. The new 
one is not yet emerging. However, the next (imminent) financial crisis will be the test of 
make it or break it. The triggers may be various and many. One may be the failure of the 
75 Stiglitz J. Can the Euro Be Saved? Project Syndicate. 13 June 2018.
76 Warner J. The dismal euro will stagger on and condemn Europe to further disaster. The Telegraph. 
3 January 2019.
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insolvent Deutsche Bank which is kept together by the scotch tape77. Hard choices need 
to be made. What will come out of it is anybody’s guess. Nonetheless, one thing is certain: 
the outcome will not be glorious. 
Many believed that a common currency was unthinkable in Europe some three dec-
ades ago. It looked like a pie in the sky. Still, it happened. Many think that fiscal and po-
litical unions are impossible now. Political will and commitment (if they exist) may prove 
them wrong and may avoid turning Maastricht into Arnhem (air distance 127 km). No 
matter how the eurozone crisis ends, it will not be happy. The final message from this ar-
ticle is that, in spite of gloom and doom, some hesitant optimism about the future of the 
reformed eurozone is justified, with an emphasis on ‘hesitant’, however, as time passes by, 
these federalist hopes evaporate78. 
Economic performance of the eurozone has been a great disappointment for most of 
the participating countries. The euro has been overvalued for most of its member coun-
tries which hampered exports. The objective of the euro was to stimulate growth and 
provide certain stability, however it became a dysfunctional currency that created troubles 
chaos and a currency with unhappy and uncertain future. Rather than fostering growth 
and certain economic convergence among the participating countries, the euro “has fos-
tered divergence among its member countries thus leading to the underperformance of 
the euro area and undermining its resilience to external shocks” [Bagnai, Granville, Mon-
geau Ospina, 2017, p. 524]. 
There exists a consensus about the dysfunctional structure of the eurozone. Having 
this diagnosis is important, but there is a discord on the way to resolve the problem: the 
Germans and a few thrifty others argue in favour of strict application of the existing rules, 
while many others such as French or Italians are in favour of relaxing those statutes. 
The eurozone was supposed to serve the Europeans and to provide them with a 
brighter economic future. Now, the Europeans are asked to serve and save the eurozone, 
i. e. to accept lower wages, higher taxes and reduction in social benefits (yellow vest protes-
tors). Is this the promising way forward for the eurozone?
Fiat currencies are not forever. The longest surviving ones and shining exceptions 
are the US dollar, the pound sterling and the Swiss franc. The possible dissolution of the 
eurozone would not be the end of the world. It would just return the EU where it was in 
1992, hence one needs to prepare for the post-eurozone EU. If federal-type reforms are not 
belatedly implemented, it may be better to leave the eurozone and save whatever could be 
saved in the EU. 
I am grateful to Eric Fiechter, Zeynep Kaplan, Jovan Njegić, Marko Malović, Patrick 
Minford, Sergei Sutyrin and two anonymous referees for their comments, assistance and 
77 A rescue financial package from Qatar in February 2019 may just postpone the debacle. 
78 Applying purely economic analysis and theory, [Jovanović, 1997, p. 68] was strongly in favour of 
monetary integration in the EU; however, he was quite sceptical about its structure and actual implementation 
in the future as set in the Maastricht Treaty (1992). He argued in favour of the postponement of the 
implementation of the eurozone. The eurozone was missing from the outset other necessary federal elements 
for long-term operational success: automatic stabilisers, eurozone bonds, rescue funds, fiscal transfers and 
strong fiscal coordination. Jovanović was wrong because he underrated at that time the strongest political 
commitment and determination to implement the eurozone as it was set by politicians in Maastricht. Is 
Jovanović this time overrating EU leaders’ political commitment, will and funds? 
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suggestions. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the position 
of the institutions for which I work. I am solely responsible for all errors and mistakes. 
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Статья посвящена рассмотрению проблем, касающихся заведомо проигрышной вой-
ны за спасение еврозоны в долгосрочной перспективе. Еврозона, главное достижение 
Европейского союза, теряет свой лоск и рискует утратить привлекательность в силу 
того, что для каждого участника перестает быть гарантией вечного процветания. Ар-
хитектура еврозоны построена на фундаменте, который готов рухнуть. Различные ме-
роприятия, такие как количественное смягчение, не смогли ускорить экономический 
рост, что спасло бы от экономических проблем. Для долгосрочного будущего еврозо-
ны необходимы глубокие реформы федерального типа. Перед политиками стоят как 
минимум две задачи по ее сохранению: во-первых, смягчить бюджетную политику и 
изменить мандат Европейского центрального банка, чтобы добиться экономического 
роста и повышения занятости и снизить инфляцию; во-вторых, ввести запоздалые фе-
деральные инструменты, такие как автоматические стабилизаторы (трансферы), нало-
говые и банковские объединения, систему управления дефолтом, простые облигации 
и механизмы урегулирования споров. Это серьезная цель, достижению которой меша-
ют политические барьеры. В случае распада еврозоны конец света не наступит — Ев-
росоюз вернется на этап развития 1992 г. Необходимо подготовить Европу к периоду 
постеврозоны. 
Ключевые слова: еврозона, денежная интеграция, оптимальная валютная зона, количе-
ственное смягчение, эффект Кантильона, Тройка, золото, распад.
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